

changed, he predicts it leads to five additional wins each year that would not otherwise have occurred. Averaging over their years in office, Nixon, Bush Sr., and Eisenhower were the most influential presidents. Ford, Clinton, Obama, Kennedy, and Bush Jr. “lack any measurable influence” (p. 67).

When engaging in low to medium levels of lobbying, the president is most effective. High levels of lobbying have tapered influence. This could reflect the fact that these were harder cases, which is why more time and resource-intensive support were deemed necessary. It could also reflect out-partisans pulling away from the president’s position; the more important the win seems to be for his party, the more that lobbying is a form of negative influence.

Presidents are more influential when their party controls the House and are more influential with co-partisans when their party is in the minority. The effect of being in the majority is stronger when polarization increases, but if their party is in the majority, polarization undermines their influence. Countering the “Two Presidencies” thesis, Cohen does not find that the president is more influential for foreign policy bills. He does find that the president has become less influential since the end of the Cold War, though he attributes this effect to increasing polarization.

A notable strength of this book is its interest in the counterfactual case. Cohen recognizes that to understand the president’s influence, scholars must consider both cases in which this treatment was applied and cases in which it was not. He also recognizes that we cannot know how House members would have acted had they been in the other condition: with or without presidential position taking. As such, his inclusion of nonpresidential roll calls, which too often are omitted in the literature, is an important methodological feature of this work.

Cohen’s work also benefits from his recognition that presidents, as rational and strategic actors, do not weigh in at random. The removal of lopsided votes and the use of propensity score weighting techniques help him account for the fact that presidents consider Congress and the public when deciding to act. Cohen balances cases on treatment propensity based on whether there is a Democratic majority in the House, whether it is a foreign policy vote, the presidential approval rating for that month, the level of party polarization in the House, whether the president’s party is in the majority, and whether the president is a Democrat. This system allows him to compare treated and untreated cases that are more similar, creating a more realistic approximation of the counterfactual case.

This is not to say the book is without weaknesses, which Cohen acknowledges in his writing. The study is limited to overt presidential positions; concealed agendas and secret lobbying could have additional influence not incorporated here. House members could also modify their behavior

with respect to the president whether or not the president states a position by individual inference in an attempt to curry favor. Presidents may also have reasons for weighing in other than a desire to influence votes, such as an election promises, credit claiming, or wanting an easy win. The models and theory also cannot predict why some presidents were more influential than others nor provide a rationale for delimiting the modern, early modern, and premodern presidencies as the literature does.

Two weaknesses Cohen does not consider are mathematical. First, rather than presenting a conservative to liberal index of presidential positions, these positions would have been better rendered as factor variables, with a reference category of no position taken. This would have more readily aligned with his discussion of presidential behavior and of the results.

Additionally, some of the hypotheses Cohen identifies in the text are stated in the form of finding no effect. A regression model can have a not significant result, but this does not demonstrate necessarily that there is truly no relationship or indicate how confident one can be in the absence of an effect. In fact, in some such cases, the regressions find a significant effect counter to Cohen’s predictions, such as the relationship between majority/minority status and foreign policy influence.

Overall, Cohen presents an interesting new view of presidents’ agency and their capacity to change congressional behavior. His findings counter the expectations of the “Two Presidencies” thesis and of the personalistic presidency. *The President on Capitol Hill* will be of interest to scholars of American politics, especially those focused on the presidency and congressional voting behavior. It also presents an invitation for presidential comparativists to study this relationship in other contexts. A companion piece examining presidential influence in the Senate is a future possibility.

**American Resistance: From the Women’s March to the Blue Wave.** By Dana R. Fisher. New York: Columbia University Press, 2019. 216p. \$26.00 cloth.

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Dana R. Fisher’s *American Resistance* is a timely intervention. The book accomplishes the challenging task of informing a general audience with an interest in social movements while bringing original data and a wealth of political science and sociological research to bear on the study of “the Resistance.” In doing so, Fisher further blurs the fragile disciplinary boundaries that divide political science and sociological approaches to the study of social movements in productive fashion. In *American Resistance*

Fisher covers an impressively broad range of topics, including the conditions that led to the movement's emergence, the identities of its participants, its novel structure, the challenges it faces for organizing and persisting over time, the diverse tactics deployed, its political consequences, and how the movement has changed since its inception. In the Resistance, Fisher observes the potential for democracy's revitalization and the Democratic Party's return to the grassroots.

This book identifies various circumstances that prompted the emergence of the Resistance. These include the increased importance of dark money in US politics, the moral outrage that President Trump ignited, and the hollowing out of the Democratic Party. Fisher traces the roots of the Resistance to the Black Lives Matter movement, Occupy Wall Street, and the women's, anti-gun, and climate movements. This is in line with previous work on the topic, including Sidney Tarrow and David Meyer's *The Resistance* (2018).

Resisters came into this movement with various aims. Some sought to bring newcomers to activism, other groups wanted to challenge the Democratic Party's minimalist organizing approach, and still others worked to get progressives elected. Fisher finds that these aims changed over time. The study's design, consisting of three waves of surveys and multiple interviews with movement leaders, allows Fisher to observe that Resisters became increasingly interested in women's issues, enacting social democratic policies, and building power against corporate interests.

The Resistance has been largely successful on the electoral front. It accomplished swing-state victories during special elections since 2016 and in the 2018 midterm election. Some organizations managed to register vast numbers of voters, fought racial gerrymandering, pushed for ballot measures, and canvassed often-ignored districts. Despite the failure of previous movements to exert influence on political parties, Fisher observes that the Resistance undertook the task of addressing the organizational weakness of the Democratic Party, igniting contention within the party to shift it to the Left and bring it back to the grassroots.

Yet, despite their achievements on the electoral front, resisters were not only focused on electoral politics. Fisher finds that the Resistance is a tactically diverse movement that combines activism in the streets with organizing in congressional districts. Resisters have been credited with thwarting the Republican repeal of the Affordable Care Act, ending the Trump administration's family separation policy, and engaging individuals in politics for the first time in their lives.

The organizing approach that Fisher identifies in the Resistance—distributed organizing—does not prescribe a series of priorities for the movement's agenda. Instead, distributed organizing, Fisher argues, entails a fluid form of membership, geographically diffuse organizing, and

loosely affiliated networks, all facilitated by the use of digital tools. In *American Resistance* Fisher demonstrates a dual concern for questions about structuring social movements and identity. The informally structured agenda-setting processes that take place under distributed organizing raise questions about who leads, who decides, where to organize, how to spend and transfer resources, and which issues to prioritize. At stake is the extent to which the Resistance is representative of the diversity of groups it claims to resist for, such as those affected by the Trump administration's immigration policies and those at the frontlines of efforts to address and adapt to climate change. Activists and scholars have raised these concerns about the Resistance since its inception.

During the 2017 Women's March, minority activists asked their white counterparts, "Will I see you in the next Black Lives Matter protest?" As these protesters expected, Fisher finds that marches for racial justice drew the smallest crowds in the Resistance, and resisters showed less support for minority issues than other issues. Interestingly, survey results show that broad sectors of the Resistance were motivated by an intersectional array of interests, which are defined as "identity-based interests that ... cross race, class, gender, sexual orientation, and other categories of identity" (p. 48). Fisher argues that the intersectional motivations for participating in the Resistance can be used to build coalitions within the movement and across different groups, thereby increasing the number and diversity of participants. Fisher confirms this expectation, as she finds that the Resistance was largely able to cope with the controversies that surrounded the increasingly diversified leadership, and the Women's March protest attendance increased.

Yet, challenges for organizing remain. In *American Resistance* Fisher confirms what activists and scholars have observed (see, for example, Lara Putnam and Theda Skocpol's "Middle America Reboots Democracy," *Democracy*, February 2018): educated white women make up the largest share of resisters. Challenges remain as resources continue to be injected into organizations with short histories of organizing, and organizations show an over-reliance on volunteer work instead of paid staff. This raises questions about who can afford to volunteer their time and whether nonwhite resisters will be interested in engaging in activism in predominantly white spaces. Although Fisher's observations about the intersectional motivations of Resisters hold promise for the strength-in-diversity and intersectional solidarity perspectives, it is not clear who the Resistance resists for; that is, whether the intersectional motivations and interest that Fisher identifies translate into advocacy agendas that prioritize the issues of intersectionally marginalized groups. Relatedly, the Resistance's distributed organizing model that Fisher identifies may create barriers to sustained participation for low-income aspiring resisters because of the movement's

overreliance on volunteer work, digital tools, and informal networks.

Fisher finds that, in line with previous research on contemporary protest politics, digital tools lower the costs of movement participation in the Resistance. Yet, attending mass demonstrations in the increasingly gentrified Washington, DC, metropolitan region and canvassing in congressional districts may entail costs that continue to be unbearable for economically and racially marginalized groups. Further, Fisher recognizes that some of the digital tools deployed for the Resistance's distributed organizing may have the unintended consequence of weakening the development of social ties. Although algorithms may build new bridges for geographically dispersed populations, they may not be a desirable substitute for deeper social ties. Perhaps movements like the Resistance can build on their tactically diverse repertoire of collective action so as to harness the benefits of digital tools while avoiding their pitfalls.

*American Resistance* demonstrates that this movement is not simply an effort to deter attacks on social policies, bigotry, and hatred. Fisher's follow-up surveys find that, over time, a larger share of resisters signaled a preference for social policies and a deeper analysis of the policy instruments that a social democratic turn would entail. Fisher shows that the motivation for praxis in the age of Trump has changed over time: it exceeds a push to counter Trump's political agenda. It is also a movement that is imagining new, more just, democratic, and equitable futures.

**Framing Inequality: News Media, Public Opinion, and the Neoliberal Turn in U.S. Public Policy.** By Matt Guardino. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. 328p. \$99.00 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

**Fox Populism: Branding Conservatism as Working Class.** By Reece Peck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 308p. \$99.99 cloth, \$29.99 paper.  
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*Framing Inequality* focuses on the role that the news industry has played in the rise of neoliberalism in the United States since the early 1980s. In it, Matt Guardino asks why middle- and low-income Americans often voice support for economic policies that are not in their immediate self-interest—policies such as President Reagan's 1981 tax cuts, the replacement of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) with the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) in 1996, and President George W. Bush's 2002 tax cuts and their 2010 extension. Economic gains from these policies have

accrued disproportionately to high-income individuals, and they have increased income inequality. Guardino argues that these policies, therefore, should not be as popular with average Americans as they have been. He contends that news coverage of neoliberal policies has been systematically biased in their favor and that this pattern of coverage explains their appeal among middle- and low-income individuals.

Guardino draws on a range of well-known lines of scholarship—including literature on issue framing effects, media indexing, news slant, and the commoditization of the news—to build a theory he calls “media refraction.” He argues that corporate profit motives in the news industry, coupled with its deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s, aligned the interests of media organizations with neoliberal policies. This alignment coincided with the emergence of party leaders on the Right *and* Left who supported—or at least voted for—neoliberal policies during the Reagan era and later. The theory holds that relatively low levels of elite dissent and the growing influence of corporate power within the news industry resulted in several important changes to the quality and content of news reports about taxes and welfare-state policies: (1) a decrease in hard news focused on these policies, (2) an increase in strategy and tactics coverage (as opposed to substantive policy debate), (3) the marginalization of nongovernmental voices, and (4) an overrepresentation of conservative, neoliberal points of view. This coverage, in turn, he argues, has shaped public opinion in meaningful ways.

To test his theory, Guardino offers two detailed case studies (one on Reagan's 1981 tax plan and another on the debate surrounding PRWORA), a number of short illustrative examples, and one survey experiment. With the case studies, Guardino documents levels of elite disagreement by analyzing the content of congressional floor debates on the respective policies. He couples this with an analysis of news coverage about the policies from nightly network newscasts, *USA Today*, and the *Associated Press*. The combined content analysis from two venues is one of the strongest aspects of the research design: it allows Guardino to assess levels of elite disagreement and to compare them with the ideological slant of news reporting. In the case of the Reagan tax plan, for instance, he finds that the net neoliberal slant in news reports is approximately five points greater than the net slant of congressional speeches—which he argues provides marginal support for the media refraction theory (see p. 90).

Many of the remaining findings from the content analyses serve to reaffirm findings established by earlier studies. For instance, the media's preoccupation with the strategies and tactics involved in lawmaking and campaigning, and the corresponding marginalization of policy substance, has been demonstrated by numerous authors, including me (e.g., Mary Layton Atkinson, *Combative*